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The belief that the U.S. is a nation of spendthrifts, unwilling to pro—
v-ide for the future, rests on observations of particular narrow definitions
of capital formation, on the use of nominal values that ignore inter-
national differences in the relative prices of capital goods, and on con-
centration on the ratio of capital formation to total output rather than on
the amount of capital formation per capita.
By a broad definition of capital formation, the U.S. has been investing
a proportion of its gross output in the last decade and a half that is not
far below that of other developed countries, even in nominal terms. In
world prices, or real terms, U.S. capital formation was a higher proportion
of output than in nominal terms.
Real gross capital formation per capita in the U.S., even by a narrow def i-
nition of capital formation, was above the average for developed countries. By
a broad measure of capital formation, few countries surpassed the U.S. in per
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Introduction
Ever since World War II, the U.S. has been thought of as a spendthrift
nation —acountry that consumes almost all its income and that saves and
adds to its capital stock at a low rate, not quite the lowest perhaps, but
far down in the standings in the world saving league. Questions have been
raised also about the quality of American investment. Americans are thought
to have invested relatively large amounts in housing and consumer durables
which are supposedly less productive than investments in industry or construc-
t ion.
If the standard data on the proportion of output devoted to gross capital
formation are taken at face value, they show that for the U.S., the ratio of
gross capital formation to GNP since 1960 has not differed much from that of
the period 1860-1938; it was 19.0 per cent in the earlier period and 17.9 per
cent in the later one (Table 1).
For the 40 years or so before 1910, and still during the period between
the two World Wars, the U.S. ranked very high in the proportion of output
devoted to capital formation in the conventional sense. Of 10 developed
countries studied by Kuznets (1966), the U.S. had the highest investment rate
(gross domestic capital formation relative to GNP) in the 1870's and 1880's,
the second highest in the 1890's and 1900's, and the third highest in
1909-1929. By the 1950's, however, the U.S. had next to the lowest rate,
ahead only of the U.K. Later decades found the U.S. still at the bottom of
this list, in a tie with the U.K. At the other end of the distribution, JapanTable 1
Gross Fixed Capital Formation as Percent of GNP, Ten Countries
Pre-Worid War II and Post-World War II
aAverage of sub-period rates weighted by lengths of sub-periods. Although
the spans of the periods called "Pre-WWII" vary, they generally include some
part of the late 19th Century and the period in the 20th Century up to the
late 1930's.
Source: Pre—WWII and 1950-59: Kuznets (1966), Table 5.3











Pre—WWII Pre_WWIIa 1950—59 1960—84
U.S. 19.0(1869-1938) 17.9 17.9 .94 .94
Australia16.3(1861—1938/39)28.6 25.4 1.75 1.56
Canada 19.9(1870-1930) 25.0 22.4 1.26 1.13
Japan 12.9(1887—1936) 29.4 31.9 2.28 2.47
Denmark 11.7(1870—1930) 18.9 22.2 1.62 1.90
Germany 17.9(1851—1928) 23.7 23.1 1.32 1.29
Italy 12.6(1861—1930) 20.8 20.5 1.65 1.63
Norway 14.0(1865—1934) 29.9 29.4 2.14 2.10
Sweden 12.7(1861-1940) 21.2 22.0 1.67 1.73
U.K. 8.6(1860—1929) 15,5 18.2 1.80 2.12—2—
devoted the highest proportion of its output to capital formation.
The U.S. apparently fell from saving leader to savinglaggard because
the ratio of gross capital formation to totaloutput changed little in the
U.S. between the pre-WW II years and the later period, while it increasedin
every other country, including even the U.K. Since the 1960's, the United
States and the United Kingdom have had the lowest capital formationratios.
However, the rough constancy in the U.S. ratio was unique; the closestwas
the Canadian ratio which has been only a little more than 10per cent above
the pre—WW II level. In the other countries, the ratiorose by at least a
third, and they more than doubled in a couple of cases. Thus, in the decades
following WW II, even relatively low-saving countries have invested more of
their incomes in fixed capital than formerly high-saving countriessuch as
Canada and the U.S. had invested in the past.
Finding a Yardstick to Measure Saving and Investment
The usual picture of the current, or recent standing of the U.S.as a
saver is based on the personal saving rate: saving by individuals as aper
cent of disposable personal income, the saving rate regularlyreported by the
Department of Commerce and widely publicized. The comparison for thistype of
saving can be summarized in the fact that over the decade 1970-1980 the U.S.
household saving rate was less than two thirds of theaverage in eight other
OECD countries for which roughly comparable data could be obtained(Table 2).
As can be seen from the table, it makes a considerable difference whetherwe
look at national saving or household saving and whether we look atgross or
net saving.
We have followed Kuznets and other writers In usinggross rather thanTable 2
International Comparison of Saving Rates, 1970-80





eThese are the countries covered
shows all four saving measures
in our analysis for which the source
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aNet saving as per cent of net disposable income
bGross saving as per cent of gross disposable income
CUS National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The main differen-
ces from the SNA concept are the treatment of all government purcha-
ses as consumption in the NIPA, whereas the SNA treats government
construction and equipment purchases (except military) as investment
and, in the household accounts, the treatment of estate and gift
taxes as current outlays in the NIPA and capital outlays in the SNA.
See Blades and Sturm (1982), p. 2.
dUN System of National Accounts—3-
net saving and capital formation. There are several reasons for that choice.
One is skepticism regarding available measures of capital consumption, and
particularly their comparability among countries (Blades and Sturm, 1982).
For example, Hayashi (1986) points out that Japanese depreciation is calcu-
lated on the basis of historical cost and that the adjustment to a replacement
cost basis amounted to as much as 30 per cent of reported private saving in
some years. Another reason for the use of gross measures is the belief that
the introduction of new capital equipment brings new technology into the
production process, whether or not the new equipment is nominally a repla-
cement for old equipment embodying past technology. If technology, rather
than the "volumet' in some sense of capital equipment, is what drives econo-
mic growth, it is the gross rather than the net capital formation that is
relevant for explaining growth. A country in which gross capital formation
was equal to calculated depreciation, and therefore resulted in no net
capital formation, would nevertheless reap economic growth from the substi-
tution of new technology for old technology.
Turning from the statistics of capital formation to the data on
saving,1 we find that all measures here show the U.S. saving rate to have
been low in the 1970's by comparison with that of other countries. That is
particularly the case for net saving. Among 24 OECD countries the U.S. was
the lowest on net (48% of the average of the others) and gross (76%)
national saving. Gross and net household saving data are available for
fewer countries. As compared with 8 other countries that Blades and Sturm
examined more closely and for which household saving rates were available, the
11n the OECD accounts that we use in thispaper the sum of domestic
capital formation and net foreign investment is defined to be equal to
domestic saving. We focus on domestic capital formation in our calcula-
tions, but alternate between that concept and domestic saving in corn-—4—
U.S. national net saving rate was 45% below the average while the gross was
only 24% below. The difference was smaller for the household saving rate, 37%
on net, 20% on gross.
For several reasons we focus on aggregate private or national saving,
rather than household saving, for our international comparisons. One reason
is that the household data are too inaccurate in each country and raise more
problems of international comparability than the aggregate private or national
data. Another is that there is evidence of substitution between household
saving, business saving, and at least the social insurance part of government
saving. A third is that for explaining economic growth, aggregate saving and
investment are more relevant than the saving of any single sector.
In addition to the economic significance of national as compared with
household saving, there is good reason to believe that the national saving
data, while subject to many problems of measurement, are more accurate than
household saving measures. The national data are protected in a sense by the
availability of a control total: aggregate domestic saving must, by defini-
tion, equal aggregate domestic capital formation plus net foreign invest-
ment, the estimates for which merit more confidence. There is no such
independent and relatively reliable check on estimates of the saving of any
single sector.
parisons with other studies, ignoring the difference between them, net
foreign investment.
By and large, long-run trends in domestic saving and domestic capital
formation are similar for most countries over most periods. Similarly, the
ranking of countries by saving rates is close to their ranking by capital
formation rates. We do, therefore, draw inferences about one from the
other at times, but we do point out some differences between the saving and
capital formation measures, particularly in discussing recent events in the
U.S.—5—
Broad Measures of U.S. Saving or Capital Formation
Aside from the issue of whether to measure saving gross or net of capi-
tal consumption, touched on earlier, the major issue in measurement is the
distinction between current expenditures and capital expenditures. What
kind of expenditures should be categorized as yielding income beyond the
current period?
Broad measures of investment, and correspondingly broad output measures,
have been calculated for the United States by Kendrick (1976) and Eisner
(1985).2 Both authors include in Investment such items as investment in human
capital, including education, on—the-job training, child rearing costs, and
costs of labor mobility and migration, investment in tangible household capi-
tal, such as durable consumer goods, and investment in intangible capital such
as research and development. Kendrick's adjustments to the conventional NIPA
measure for the United States (as available to him at that time) raised the
estimated share of gross investment in GNP as follows:
1929 1969
Official Estimate,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce 16.5 14.8
Kendrick 43.7 495
Source: Kendrick (1976), Tables 3-2 and C-i.
Not only was the 1969 level more than tripled but the decline in the ratio
between 1929 and 1969, shown in the official data, was reversed.
Eisner's alterations to the official U.S. accounts apply only to the
2Somealternativecalculations of household saving and different views
on its correct measurement can be found in Auerbach (1985) and Hendershott
and Peek (1985).-6-
years after World War II but the story they tell of much higher levels of
saving and capital formation than in the official records is similar
(Table 3). Eisner's concept of capital accumulation includes semidurables with
durables as a form of investment and, more important, includes net real capi-
tal gains and losses. The latter addition makes the series much more volatile
relative to GNP. If we exclude the revaluations and investment in household
semidurables, the modified Eisner estimates are still at least twice as high
as the official ones over most of the period. They show a rising trend through
the 1960's and approximate stability after that.
Perhaps the most radical restructuring of national accounts encompassing
the widest range of investment in human capital is that in Jorgenson and
Pachon (1983). This calculation includes imputations for the value of time
spent in schooling not only during working age but also before working age.
Furthermore, the value of time spent in schooling is calculated from the
increment in lifetime earnings rather than from the value of foregone earnings
in the labor market. The estimates included values of human capital based on
lifetime earnings for those born in each year and for immigrants. The results
of these calculations are:
1950-591960-691970-73
Saving asof "Full Private National Expend." 68.4 74.6 75.3
"Human Saving" as % of "Full Saving" 94.3 95.9 96.0
In other words, private saving in the U.S. has been more than two thirds
of private expenditures through the postwar period and rose to about three
quarters in the 1960's and 1970's. Thus, by these measures, the private eco-
nomy of the United States was consuming less than a third, and later less thanTable 3
Comparison of Eisner and Conventional Measures of
U.S. Capital Formation and GNP
(Unit $billion)
19461956 1966 1976 1981
Eisner
Gross domestic capital accumulation 31.8283.6 498.31,360.41,677.9
GNP 291.1726.51,246.83,067.24,560.1
Ratio 10.7 39.0 40.0 44.4 36.8
Net revaluations -75.3 27.7 12.0 248.4 —153.7
Household semidurables 19.9 26.7 40.6 82.1 125.6
Gross domestic capital accumulation
exci. revaluations and semidurables86.5229.2 445.71,029.91,706.0
GNP excl. revaluatjons 366.4698.81,234.82,818.84,713.8
Ratio 23.6 32.8 36.1 36.5 36.2
Conventional (BEA) Ratio: 14.6
(Gross Private Domestic Investment/GNp)
16.8 16.6 15.0 16.1
Source: Eisner (1985)—7—
a quarter, of its income. Saving and capital formation as conventionally
defined were an almost negligible part--less than 5 per cent--of total private
saving and capital formation.
International Comparisons of Saving and Capital Formation on a Broad Basis
Unfortunately, broad measures of saving and capital formation have not
been calculated on a comparable basis for a large number of countries over
long periods of time. The important question for our purposes is whether the
use of these broader definitions would raise the calculated saving rate of
other countries by similar proportions, still leaving the U.S. a relatively
low saver, or whether the ranking of the U.S. as a saver depends on the def i-
nition of saving.
In order to answer this question, we experiment with the saving ratios
for the 1970s and 1980s, calculating the effects of extending the scope of the
saving measure to include provisions for the future that fall outside the con-
ventional national accounting concept of saving. These extensions, and others,
have been considered by Kendrick and Eisner in their work on the U.S., but our
efforts here are confined to those for which some calculations were available,
or could be performed fairly readily, for a considerable number of countries.
We draw on the work of Blades and Sturm (1982) and Blades (1983) who had a
similar objective and sought also to improve comparability among countries,
but we have made our own calculations.
Consumer Ourables. The logic of treating households' purchases of consumer
durables as capital formation, corresponding to business purchases of durable
producers goods, is similar to that for the treatment of house purchases as
capital formation in the present systems of national accounts. These goods-8-
produce services over a long period of time, and the servicesare, in many
cases, very similar to those yielded by the durabls bought by business. Cars,
the largest item in consumer durables, give transportation servicewhether
they are owned by businesses or by households. Some of those owned by busi-
nesses are leased to households for their own use. Refrigerators, freezers,or
laundry machinery often provide services to households even if they are owned
by businesses. In fact, the distinction between consumer and producer durables
in the national accounts rests on ownership rather than function.
To treat purchases of consumer durables as capital formation in thesame
way as purchases of owner-occupied housing, it is necessary to make two
adjustments. One is to add to conventional gross fixed capital formation
household expenditures on consumer durables (treated asconsumption in both
the SNA and the U.S. national income accounts). The second is to addto con-
sumption and output a measure of the current services of consumer durbles.
This adjustment requires information on the stock of consumer durables and
calculations of the services derived from them by consumers.Unfortunately,
such calculations are available in detail only for the United States, butwe
have made some rough estimates of the necessary magnitudes. We have done this
by combining OECD data on purchases of consumer durables with Go1dsmfths
estimates of the stock of consumer durables for a number of countries and
assuming that missing ingredients of the calculation could be filled in by
using the U.S. relationships.
The effect of adding purchases of consumer durables to the conventional
measures of capital formation can be seen in the following comparison:-9-




Average of 11 other countriesa 23.5 27.6
U.S. as % of average of 11 countries 77. 83.
acanada Japan, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, U.K.
Source: Appendix Tables 1 and 2
This adjustment alone eliminates more than a quarter of the difference bet-
ween the U.S. and the other countries. It also compresses the range of saving
ratios slightly, since the addition is smallest for Japan and relatively
large for the U.S. A possible interpretation of this reduction in the range of
rates is that there is some substitution between investment in consumer
durables and other forms of saving.
Education. Ideally, we would wish to add to conventional capital formation
measures all forms of human capital investment. These would include the ear-
nings foregone by students while they are in school and the costs of on-the-
job training. However, such data are not available in any internationally
comparable form. The one part of such investment for which we can make calcu-
lations for a fair number of countries, and even these require some bold esti-
mating, is expenditures on education. These expenditures yield a return over a
long period of time in the form of higher earnings in the labor force. They
also probably yield returns in the form of better care of children and greater
efficiency in consumption, even after retirement. Some part of the cost of
education might more properly be treated as consumption, but any over-estimate
of capital formation on that account should be more than balanced by our- 10-
omissionof foregone earnings. The effect of making this adjustment alonecan
be seen in the following:
Per cent of GDP, 1970—84
Conventional Capital Formation mci.
Capital Formation Expenditure on Education
U.S. 18.1 24.2
Average of other 14 countriesa 23.3 28.6
U.S. asof average 78. 85.
aSame countries as for previoustable, plus Australia, Belgium and Germany
Source: Appendix Tables 1 and 3
Once again, the effect of the broadening of the concept of capital formation
is to move the United States somewhat closer to theaverage of the other deve-
loped countries, reducing the gap by more than a quarter.
We can combine the adjustments for consumer durables and education for
only 11 of the 14 countries, because data on consumer durables were not
available for Australia, Belgium, and Germany. The results are onlyslightly
affected by this limitation, since the average saving rate for the 11
countries, including education expenditures, is only sli9htly higher than that
for the 14. The effect of the combination of the two adjustments isas
follows:
Per cent of GDP, 1970—84
Conventional Capital Formation mci.
Capital FormationConsumer Durables and
Education
U.S. 18.1 28,4
Average of other 11 countries 23.5 32.8
U.S. asof average 77. 87.
Source: Appendix Tables 1 and 3— 11—
Almosthalf of the apparent gap in investment rates between the U.S. and the
other 11 countries is eliminated when we broaden the concept of investment to
encompass expenditures on both consumer durables and education.
Research and Development. Research and development is an activity that is pro-
bably more forward-looking than much of investment in equipment and probably
includes less current consumption than education. It is thus an even stronger
candidate for treatment as capital formation.
Incorporating R & 0 expenditures into the measures of capital formation
involves, in some cases, an addition to the measure of total output as well.
The shift of government and private nonprofit R & D does not require any
adjustment, since they are treated in the SNA and the U.S. NIPA as government
and household sector consumption, and therefore as final product. However,
business enterprise expenditures on R & 0 are treated in these accounts as
costs of current production. The shift to treatment of these as capital for-
mation requires that they be removed from current expenditures, raising the
level of business enterprise saving and capital formation, and therefore of
gross output also. These calculations are described in the Appendix. The
effect of adding R & 0 expenditures alone is small, since the range is only
from 1 per cent to less than 2½ per cent of GOP, but the result of adding
them, along with education expenditures, to gross capital formation is as
follows:— 12—
Percent of GDP, 1970-84
Conventional Capital Formation mci.
Capital Expenditure Ofl:
Formation Education and R & 0
U.S. 18.1 26.2
Average of other 12 countries 23.0 29.9
U.S. asof average of 12 79. 88.
Source: Appendix Tables 1 and 4
The broadening of the capital formation concept, as before, substantially
reduces the gap between the U.S. and the other developed countries, now by
over 40 per cent. If we add to these two adjustments the inclusion of consumer
durables expenditure, as we can do for 10 of the 12 countries other than the
U.S., the gap is reduced still further:
Per cent of GDP, 1970-84_________
Conventional Capital Formation mci.
Capital Expend. on Education, R & 0,
Formation and Consumer Durables
U.S. 18.1 30.1
Average of other 10 countries 23.3 33.9
U.S. asof average of 10 78. 89.
Source: Appendix Tables 1 and 4
Half of the gap is eliminated, and the U.S. capital formation rate is only
about 10 per cent below that of the other countries.
Military Capital Formation
It is conventional, and part of both the UN's System of National Accounts
and the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, to treat expenditures on
construction and equipment for defense as current government consumption
rather than capital formation. Yet, whatever their other faults and virtues,- 13-
andwhatever their contribution or lack of contribution to the growth of non-
military output, these expenditures are intended to yield output over a long
period of time. If we are interested in the extent to which a country sacrifi-
ces present consumption for future gains, these expenditures are as relevant
as those for civilian consumption.
The inclusion of military capital formation, as we would expect, raises
the U.S. saving rate relative to all but one of the other countries for which
we can make the comparison, and particularly relative to Japan.
Per cent of GDP, 1970-84
Conventional Capital Formation mci.
Capital Expenditures on Education,




Average of other 10 countries 23.3 34.5
U.S. as % of average of 10 78 91
Source: Appendix Tables 1 and 5
With military capital formation included, the gap between the U.S. and the
other developed countries is reduced by about 60 per cent.
Other Adjustments to the Investment Concept. The adjustments we have made
bring the U.S. investment ratio from less than 80 to over 90 per cent of
those of the other major industrialized countries. There are some further
adjustments we did not attempt. One would be to add investment in the form of
the foregone earnings of students. A recent estimate puts this item at over 60
per cent of expenditures on education (Johnson, 1985). As the proportion of
working-age students attending higher education institutions is higher in the
U.S. than in all or most of the other countries, the inclusion of this form of- 14-
investmentwould raise the U.S. investment rate and bring it closer to the
average.
Among other possible adjustments, the inclusion of more of the house-
hold economy in the accounts (in addition to owner-occupiedhousing and consumer
durables) would probably raise the denominator (GNP) most for countries with low
female labor force participation rates, and thus lower theirsaving rates rela-
tive to countries such as Sweden. The addition of rearing costs toinvestment,
as in Kendrick (1976), would raise saving rates for countries with relatively
rapid population growth such as Canada and the U.S., relative to the European
countries.
As mentioned above, we have followed, with modifications, some of the
procedures of the earlier comparisons in Blades and Sturm (1982) and Blades
(1983). However, we have been a little more free, or perhaps reckless, in
estimating missing observations. rn general, our results confirm theirs
despite the differences in method. Both suggest that the more readily feasible
adjustments eliminate about half or more of the observed differences between
the U.S. and other developed countries in the shares of totaloutput devoted
to gross capital formation. That leaves the U.S., as measured, almost 10per
cent below the average of the others, although still low in the ranking:
ninth out of eleven in our calculations. And both suggest that the unmeasured
items might well erase much of that remaining gap. Similarly, a more recent
comparison of household saving rates in the U.S. with those of 5 other deve-
loped countries in 1980-82 by the Deutsche Bundesbank (1984) suggested that
about half of the difference between the U.S. and the other five,including
Japan, and more than half of the difference between the U.S. and the European- 15-
countries,were the consequence of differences in methods of calculating
saving.
One can think of shares of saving or capital formation in GOP as
measuring some type of investment "effort" or willingness to sacrifice present
consumption for future benefits. By a standard that includes both conventional
and some non-conventional types of capital formation, the U.S. ranks in the
second half of the distribution of industrial countries and is about average
for that group.
Expanded Capital Formation
as Per Cent of GOP, 1970-84
U.S. Oifference from Average, exci. U.S., of
10 Countries -9%
8 Countries, cxci. Japan & Norway -5%
7 Countries, cxci. Japan, Norway, & Canada -3%
5 Lower saving countries 0
Source: Appendix Table 5
The evidence of these data does not suggest that Americans have been
substantially more "present-minded," or neglectful of future needs, than the
citizens of most other developed countries.
Real Investment Ratios: How Much Capital Goods Does the Saving of Different
Countries Buy?
While the share of total output in current prices may reflect a country's
willingness to sacrifice present consumption to increase welfare later, it
does not necessarily indicate how much capital is being acquired through that
sacrifice. The reason is that capital goods are more expensive relative to
other goods in some countries than in others. Capital goods are cheaper rela—— 16—
tiveto prices in general in the U.S. than in most other countries.
As between two countries with the same nominal saving or capital for-
mation ratios and equal GOPs, as measured in the usual way in each country's
own prices, the one in which the prices of capital goods are low will be
setting aside more current output in physical terms for the production of
future income; its real capital formation ratio will be higher. Thus, it is to
be expected that the U.S. real capital formation ratio will compare more
favorably with that of other countries than will its nominal (own-price)
ratio.3
The impact of these differences in price relationships on comparative
capital formation ratios is summarized below for 1975 and 1980, years for
which detailed comparisons of prices and real product are available from
the UN International Comparison Project for a substantial number of our
countries. Ratios of conventionally—defined capital formation to GOP, both
measured in nominal prices (based on own-country prices), corresponding to
the ratios in earlier text tables, are shown in column 1.
3The comparisons here are based on U.S. prices. They are obtainedby
dividing own-currency expenditures by the purchasing power of the national
currency vis-a-vIs the U.S. dollar. To shift these to comparisons based on
world prices, it would be necessary to multiply each component PPP by the
international price, as given in the last column of Table 6.3, pp. 176-179,
and Appendix Table 6.3, pp. 208-215, of Kravis, Heston, and Summers, 1982.U.S.
Average of other 8 countries
U.S. as % of average
18.5 18.5 26.6 30.6 31.7
22.0 20.5 27.7 31.4 32.1
84.1 90.2 96.1 97.2 98.9
aWorld prices used to obtain the real ratios.
bjapan, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and U.K.
Source: Appendix Table 6
In these two years, the shift to real investment ratios raises the U.S. ratio
of capital formation to GOP by 4 and 6 percentage points, relative to the
average, to 76% and 90% (column 2). When the concept of investment is
broadened to include other provisions for future flows of goods and services,
still retaining the real investment ratio concept, the inclusion of expedi-
tures on education and R & 0 reduces the margin between the U.S. and the other
seven countries by about half (column 3). The further inclusion of spending on
consumer durable goods brings the reduction in the difference to more than a
— 17—
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1975
U.S.
Average of other 8 countriesb
U.S. as % of average
16.3 16.3 24.8 29.1 30.4
22.7 21.5 28.5 32.8 33.4
71.8 75.8 86.7 88.7 91.1
1980- 18-
half.Finally, when we add military capital formation, the U.S. ratio of
capital formation to GOP rises to 91 per cent of theaverage of the other
eight countries in 1975 and 99 per cent in 1980.
Among the other countries, shown individually in the Appendix, Japan's
real ratio on our most inclusive basis was still the highest, almost40 to 42
per cent compared to 31-43 per cent for Belgium, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands.
Since this comparison is confined to twoyears and to eight countries, two
other points should be noted. One is that 1975 was aparticularly unfavorable
year for the U.S., to judge from the conventional investment ratios. For the
other countries, taken as a group, the investment ratio in 1975was close to
the average of 1970-84, but in the United States it was 8per cent below the
period average. The other is that the comparison with these eight countries
shows the U.S. in a less favorable light than the earliercomparisons with 11
or 14 countries. These facts suggest that a comparison of broadly defined
investment ratios for the whole period and for more countries would almost
certainly find the U.S. close to the average of the other countries.
Per Capita Capital Formation
When real ratios of capital formation to GDP are compared usinga
broadened definition of investment, the U.S. climbs a little from the bottom
position (the lowest ratio, well below the next lowest) into the lowerrungs
of the industrial countries in 1975 and to the median position in1980
(Appendix Table 6). That fact suggests that the U.S. ratio, applied to a
higher income than that of most other countries, may entail more real invest-
ment per capita than in other countries.- 19 -
Ifwe compare the U.S. with the same eight countries on the basis of both
conventional and broader concepts of capital formation, the results are as
fol lows:
Capital Formation per Capita,
$U.S. at U.S. Prices: 1975 and 1980
Conventional Including Expenditure on
EducationEducation, Education,
and R & D andR & 0, Durables
R & 0 Consumer and Military
_________DurablesCapital Formation
1975
U.s. 1,172 1,805 2,343 2,448
Average of other 8 countries1,134 1,515 1,893 1,926
U.S. asof average 103 119 124 127
_______________ 1980
U.S. 2,114 3,096 3,923 4,069
Average of other 8 countries1,978 2,701 3,283 3,347
U.S. asof average 107 115 120 122
Source: Appendix Table 6
Real capital formation per capita was higher in the U.S. than it was, on the
average, in the other eight countries. Measured on the conventional basis, the
US. level was exceeded by those of Japan, Germany, and France in both 1975
and 1980, but on the most inclusive basis, per capita capital formation was
highest in the U.S. in both years, a little above that of Germany and Japan in
1980 and about 15 to 17 per cent above them in 1975 (Appendix Table 6).
For the conventional measure of capital formation, some data are available
for 1980 covering many more countries, but at OECD prices rather than world-
wide prices as in the previous comparisons. If we compare per capita conven-- 20-
tionalinvestment in 1980 for the same 8 countries and for a broadergroup of
17 OECD countries, we find the following:
Conventionally Defined Capital Formation
per Capita at OECD Prices: 1980
8 Countries 17 Countries
(U.S. 100)
U.S. 100 100
Average of other countries 84.8 83.0
U.S. asof average 118 120
Source: Appendix Table 7
The U.S. margin over the other 17 countries in 1980 was a littlehigher than
that over the 8 countries, partly because some quite low income countrieswere
added to the list. Measured in these prices, conventionally defined real
capital formation per capita in the U.S. was surpassed only in Japan (by 14
per cent) and in Germany (by 7 per cent) among the 8 countries used in the
earlier calculations, and in the larger list of countries, by Canada,
Luxembourg, and Norway.
On the whole, the evidence points to the conclusion that the U.S. is
close to the average of other developed countries in the degree to which it
has used its income for forward-looking purposes-—capital formation ina broad
sense. Since the price of capital goods has been relatively low in the U.S.,
the ratio of real capital formation, broadly defined, to realoutput has com-
pared more favorably with that of the other countries than investment ratios
based on each country's own relative prices. And since the U.S.is a high-
income country, the same fraction of output devoted to investment as in other
countries has kept the U.S. investing more per capita than the otherson the
average, and more per capita than almost all the individual countries.— 21—
HasLow Saving Made the U.S. Poor in Conventional Capital?
We can think of the purpose of saving and investment as being the
accumulation of the productive wealth that leads in turn to a high level of
production and consumption. A country's wealth at any time incorporates the
results of saving over many years. It thus-provides a summary of saving
history, although wealth can be acquired in other ways, such as by changes in
the value of assets already acquired.
Unfortunately, wealth figures are subject to many imperfections, just as
saving data are. For one thing, calculations of wealth are almost always many
years out of date, Furthermore, records of wealth are kept in each country's
own currency, and these must be translated into a common currency for com-
parison. We do have very complete records of the rate at which at least the
major currencies exchange in world markets, but, as has been pointed out,
translation by this method does not yield comparability among countries.
Exchange rates do not reflect the relative purchasing power of currencies over
the stock of physical assets any more than they measure purchasing power over
currently produced commodities or services.
If net saving in the United States, conventionally defined, has been low
since World War II relative to that of other developed countries, we might
wonder whether the U.S. would by now find conventionally defined capital
relatively scarce. Has the U.S. lost its position as the most capital-abundant
country? Indeed, that is the picture one finds in some calculations. For
example, in one of these, the U.S. appears to have ranked 8th among 11 deve-
loped countries in the amount of capital per person: the U.S. capital per
capita was slightly below the average of the other 10 developed countries- 22—
(AppendixTable 8, Col. 1).
There are at least two biases in this calculation. One is that the cumu-
lation of capital expenditures, from which the capital stock is derived,
begins in 1950, ignoring all capital available at that time. Since, as we
shall see later, the U.S. had far higher capital per person in place in 1950
than most other developed countries, the method understates the stock of capi-
tal in the U.S. Secondly, the calculation assumes that a dollar's worth of
foreign currency at 1975 exchange rates bought the same amount of fixed capi-
tal in each foreign country as a dollar in the U.S. As shown above, a dollar
bought more investment goods in the U.S. than did a dollar's worth of foreign
currency in other countries.
If we adjust for only the latter bias, we find a different picture of
capital abundance. The U.S. real capital stock per person in 1975 was above
that of all but three other countries and more than 15 per cent above the
average (Appendix Table 8, Col. 2).
We can make some further comparisons for a more limited group of
countries, based on a different source and for a different definition of capi-
tal stock. This measure omits residential capital, which tends to reduce the
U.S. capital stock more than that of most other countries but refers to gross
rather than net capital stock, which has the opposite effect. The U.S. appears
in these data for the late 1970's to be on a par with Canada and Germany.
Japan, France, Italy, and the U.K. appear far less capital—abundant in these
calculations.
The largest and most carefully assembled collection of asset (and
liability) data from national sources is that of Raymond Goldsmith (1985).— 23-
Fromthese and a set of estimates provided by the OECD, we can make a com-
parison of capital per person among a dozen countries in the late 1970s and
1980 (Appendix Table 9). Using the conventional measure of net capital stock,
we find that the U.S., despite two or three decades of low conventional saving
rates, still had in the late 1970s and in 1980 one of the highest levels of
capital per person. It was the highest among the major countries, with the gap
remaining very large between the U.S.and the U.K., France, Japan, and Italy.
Where both net and gross capital stocks were available from the same source,
the gap was larger for gross stocks than for net. It may be that the U.S.
capital stock is older than most others, or that it depreciates faster, or
that a faster rate of depreciation is used in the U.S. calculations.
We are inclined to emphasize the broadest measures of capital we can find
(and regret the narrowness even of these) on the grounds mentioned earlier
with respect to capital formation. We therefore prefer measures that include
at least consumer durables, on the belief that the ownership of a car, for
example, by a household does not mean that the car performs services substan-
tially different from those provided by leased cars, taxis or public transpor-
tation, although the purchase of a car is not counted as investment and its
services are not included in income and output in official calculations.
It is in the high level of consumer capital that the U.S. is most dif-
ferent from other countries.- 24-













Source: Appendix Table 9, Col. 2
When these are added in to the conventional stock, the U.S. is shown to have
had more capital per person than any country except Canada (about equal to the
U.S.), and to have led the major industrialized countries by 20 per cent or
more (Appendix Table 9).
Although most of these measures show that at least the major foreign
countries had not yet caught up with the U.S. in their conventional capital
endowments by the mid— or late 1970s, there is little doubt as to the trend.
For example, Maddisons presumably consistent measures over the quarter cen-
tury after 1950 show every country gaining on the U.S. in conventional capital
per person.— 25-
RealConventional Gross Non-Residential
Capital Stock per Capita, 1950, 1960, and 1976
U.S. =100
1950 1960 1976
U.S. 100 100 100
Canada 78 78 95
Japan 17 33 66
France 47 61 81
Germany 40 71 80
Italy 31 46 54
U.K. 56 65 64
Source: Appendix Table 10
All these countries except Canada were at least a third below the U.S. in
1950, and all gained on the U.S., even, to some extent, the U.K., a relatively
low-saving country. The greatest transformation took place in Japan, of
course. Even in 1960, the Japanese level capital stock per person was as far
below that of the U.S. as some developing countries have been in recent years.
Since 1950, it had been multiplied more than three times relative to that of
the U.S. to a level above that of Italy and close to that of the U.K., but
still well below France and Germany. The results of the high level of Japanese
saving are thus evident in the growth of capital stock but still leave Japan
far behind other developed countries, a fact that it is hard to keep in mind
in view of Japan's trade performance.
A somewhat different measure of changes over 25 years or so for a small
set of partially overlapping countries can be derived from OECO data.- 26-
RealFixed Capital Stock per Capita
Relative to U.S.
Including Residential Excluding Residential




Finland 1970 73 78 78 84




Germany 1959 50 55 47 51.
1964 64 79 59 66






U.K. 1955 44 43 48 46
1964 49 51 53 55
1980 59 63 63 68
Source: Appendix Table 11
Although there are moderate differences in relative levels ofper capita
fixed capital where the two sets of data overlap, the direction ofchange
seems clear. In the OECD data also, every country shown increased itsper
capita stock relative to that of the U.S., whether that stock is measured
gross or net or including or excluding residential capital. Thus the relati-
vely low rate of saving in the U.S., conventionally measured, did result ina
relatively low rate of growth in capital stock, conventionally measured, but
it still left the major industrial countries below the level of U.S.capital
per person in 1980.
Unfortunately, we have little data on stocks of capital outside of conven-
tional capital and consumer durables. We can get some indication of the stock— 27—
ofeducational capital from data on years of education of various levels. The
high level of U.S. capital formation in this form is reflected in the higher
average years of formal education in the population, as shown below;
Average Years of Secondary and
Higher Educational Experience
of the Population Aged 25-64 in 1976
Secy Higher
U.s. 4.75 1.05
12 other countries 3.47 .445
U.S. asof other 12 137 236
Source: Maddison (1982), Table 5.7, p. 110
The stock of educational experience was larger in the U.S. than in the
other countries, on the average, and in this respect the U.S. also ranked
high--second only to Germany in the stock of secondary education and first, by
a long distance, in higher education.
Has the U.S. Misallocated its Capital Formation?
It is widely believed that the U.S. not only saves relatively little in
conventional terms but also funnels excessively large shares of its saving
into residential construction and consumer durables, while other countries
channel their saving into forms of investment that are regarded as more pro-
ductive, such as machinery and equipment. We investigate this question with
respect to both conventional capital formation and the broader concept and
also with respect to the stock of capital.
The question we can answer is whether there are large differences between
the U.S. and other countries in the allocation of capital. The question we
would wish to answer, ideally, is whether the allocation of capital has been- 28—
sodistorted by tax or other preferences that the productivity of capital has
been seriously reduced in the U.S. relative to other countries. This question
is extremely complex, and involves, among other problems, separating the
effects of tax preferences on the allocation of capital by sector of ownership
(households vs. business firms) from effects on the type of capital for—
mation (houses vs. factories, or cars vs. machinery). We do not know ofany
attempts to perform such an analysis across countries and discuss here only
the facts about the allocation of capital.
The Distribution of Conventional Capital Formation Among Types of Assets
The share of conventional capital formation going into residential
building has not been exceptionally high in the U.S.
Residential Building as Per Cent of
Conventional Capital Formation
1960-84 1960—69 1970-84 1970-79 1980—84
U.S. 25.6 26.0 25.4 26.5 22.7
14 countries excl. U.S. NA NA 24.8 25.2 24.0
13 " exci.U.S.
and Sweden 24.2 23.2 25.0 25.4 24.1
U.S. as per cent of
14 countries NA NA 102 105 95
13
" 106 119 102 104 94
Source: Appendix Table 12
Over the whole period, half of the countries devoted more of their capital
formation to residential building. The share in the U.S. was about 6per cent
above the average of 13 or 14 other developed countries, but it was above the
average by a large margin only in the 1960's and has been below it for the
1980's.- 29—
Overthe entire 1960-84 period, it was Denmark, Germany, and France that
invested most heavily in residential building, and Norway the least. Japan
invested a relatively small share in housing during the 1960's, about 25 per
cent below the average of the other countries listed. It moved closer to the
average in this respect in the 1970's and 1980's, but remained below average.
It should be kept in mind that these ratios represent the cost of building and
land improvement but not the cost of land, which is exceptionally high in
Japan relative to other costs of housing.
To the extent that rapid growth is associated particularly with high
levels of producer durable or machinery and equipment investment, one might
expect to find that the U.S. has been neglecting this type of capital for-
mation, while that of the fast—growing countries was heavily tilted in this
direction.
Producer Durables as Per Cent of





U.S. 42.7 32.5 10.2
12 countries exci. U.S. 38.8 29.2 9.6
U.S. as per cent of 12 countries 110 111 106
Source: Appendix Table 13
Again, at least for the last 15 years, the data do not bear out this
expectation. The share of producer durables, both transport equipment and
other machinery and equipment, in conventional capital formation was above
average in the U.S. It was the U.K., a slow-growth, low-investment country- 30-
thathad the highest share of capital formation going into machinery and
equipment, while the share in Japan was below that of the U.S. and below the
average of the other industrial countries.
If we broaden the concept of capital formation to include consumer
durables, about half of which are cars, we find some considerable differences
in the allocation of investment. The U.S. led in the proportion of investment
going into consumer durables, as we might expect from the much-discussed
favorable tax treatment of interest on consumer borrowing, only now removed
from the federal tax law.
Personal Transportation Equip. Per cent of Conventional
asof Conventional Gross Fixed Gross Fixed Capital
Capital Formation Plus Pers. Formation plus Consumer





U.S. 16.0 15.4 27.2 13.2 14.0
9 countries excl. U.S. 8.8 9.8 NA NA NA
12 countries exci. U.S. NA 9.7 NA NA NA
11 countries excl. U.S. NA NA 21.2 NA NA
10 countries exci. U.S. NA 9.7 22.3 8.3 14.0
U.S. asof 9 countries 183 157 NA NA NA
U.S. asof 12 countries NA 158 NA NA NA
U.S. asof 11 countries NA NA 128 158 93
U.S. asof 10 countries NA 159 122 159 100
Source: Appendix Table 14
However, the proportion of capital formation going into consumer durables in
Canada was the same as that in the U.S. Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and
the U.K. were not far behind. The country that allocated very little of its
investment to consumer durables was Japan, where the share was under 10 per— 31—
cent,less than half the average of other countries outside the U.S. The
United States spent most heavily, by far, on "personal transportation
equipment," especially in the 1960's, the share being almost twice the average
in 9 other countries. OECD data are not available for Japan, but the ratio
must have been low, to judge from the spending on all consumer durables. The
high expenditure on personal transportation equipment in the U.S. accounted
for all the difference between the U.S. and the other countries in the share
of durable consumer goods. In other consumer durables, the U.S. share was no
higher than that in other countries.
The Distribution of Broadly-Defined Capital Formation
For the 1970s and the first half of the 1980's, we can calculate the
distribution, by type of investment, of our broad measures of capital for-
mat ion.
Shares ()ofEach Type of Investment in
Broadly-Defined Capital Formation, 1970-1984
Average of US, asof
U.S. 10 Countries Average of
_____excl.the U.s. 10 Countries
(1) (2) (3)
Broadly-Defined Capital Formation100.0 100.0 100.0
Conventional Capital Formation 52.7 62.4 84.4
Non—Military Construction 30.2 38.4 78.7
Residential Building 13.4 15.5 86.7
Other Contruction 16.8 22.9 73.3
Non-Military Producer Durables22.5 24.0 93.6
Consumer Durables 19.7 16.4 119.9
Education 16.6 15.1 109.9
R & D 6.9 4.2 162.5
Military Capital Formation 4.2 1.8 225.7
Source: Appendix Table 15
When we compare the U.S. with the average of 10 other countries, it is
clear that conventionally-defined capital formation is a much smaller part of— 32—
broadly-definedcapital formation in the U.S. than in other countries. That is
one reason for the large gap between the U.S. and others in the usual
comparisons. The U.S. invested a lower share in every conventional form of
capital formation and a higher share in each of the non-conventional forms.
The U.S. share in construction was particularly low, even compared with the
share of its capital formation in non—military producer durables. On the other
side, the share of U.S. investment going into R & 0 and military capital for-
mation far exceeded that in other countries.
Japan was the only country with more than three quarters of its capital
formation in the types of investment conventionally included in national
accounts. It is this concentration, particularly on construction, that places
Japan so far above other countries in the usual compilations. The other side
of the story is the extremely low share of capital formation going into con-
sumer durables in Japan, hardly more than half the share in the next-lowest
countries. Japan is also at the bottom of the list in the share of investment
going into education, although several other countries are close in this
respect. The heaviest investors in R & 0 and in military capital formation
relative to other forms of investment, were the U.S. and the U.K., also the
countries with the lowest shares of investment going into construction. These
figures again do not indicate any particularly large share of U.S. capital
formation or even of U.S. construction expenditures going into residential
construction.
As was noted earlier in comparisons with conventional measures of capital
formation, the U.S. had the highest share of investment applied to consumer
durables. However, the shares of some other countries were close to the U.S.— 33-
level.If the experience of other countries is any criterion, it is difficult
to see in these proportions any enormous distortions in the composition of
U.S. capital formation from the favorable tax treatment of consumer interest
during these years.
The distribution of capital formation can be different when measured in
real values or quantities--that is, quantities valued at a common set of prices
for all countries-—from what it is in nominal (own-currency) values. The transla-
tion via common prices reduces the share of a type of investment that ispar-
ticularly expensive in a country and increases the share of a type that is
relatively cheap. The effect of using real comparisons can be seen in the
following:More often than not, the translation into international prices shows the
U.S. to have been closer to the average in the shares of capital formation
going into various types of conventional capital formation than the nominal
figures suggest, because these types of capital were relatively cheap in the
U.S. Two exceptions to the relative cheapness of capital formation in the
- 34-
Sharesin Broadly Defined Capital Formation,
Nominal Values and at International Prices,

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
100.0100.0 100.0
47.9 62.4 77 59.0 81
27.8 38.3 73 38.1
9.6 16.5 58 15.7
8.6 12.5 69 9.7 89
9.6 9.3 103 12.6 76
20.1 24.1 83 20.9 96
22.0 16.6 132 19.1
18.8 14.3 131 15.8
7.0 4.7 149 4.3 163
4.3 2.0 215 1.8 239
1980
Broadly defined capital form. 100.0100.0 100.0
Conventional capital formation52.0 59.1 88 58.4 89
Non-military Construction 28.5 36.4 78 35.0 81
Residential building 11.0 15.6 71 13.1 84
Other building 8.4 11.9 71 12.5 67
Other construction 9.2 8.8 105 9.4 98
Non—military producer durables23.4 22.7 103 23.4 100
Consumer durables 20.3 18.3 111 17.3
Education 17.2 15.8 109 17.6 98






Source: Appendix Table 6e— 35—
U.S.in both years were non-building construction and education. Shares of
both were lower in real terms because these types of investment were relati-
vely expensive in the U.S.
Measured in own—country prices, the share of broadly-defined capital for-
mation devoted to construction was substantially higher in Japan--about half of
the total—-than in other countries, as can be seen in Appendix Table 6e. But,
measured in world prices, that share was not as high; construction was relati-
vely costly in Japan relative to other types of investment. However, the propor-
tion of investment going into non-building construction, mainly infra-structure,
was notable in Japan in both years and in Germany in 1975, whichever prices were
used.
We noted earlier that the share of producer durables -in Japan was not
exceptional, but measured in world prices that share was the highest among the
countries shown in 1975 and second highest in 1980. Producer durables were
cheaper relative to other forms of investment in both Japan and the U.S., so
that, measured at world prices, the share of investment the Japanese were
devoting to producer durables was above average, and the share in the U.S. was
close to the average.
The high proportion of U.S. capital formation allocated to consumer
durables, particularly consumer transportation equipment, and to education
was noted earlier. The translation to world prices leaves the share allocated to
consumer durables in the U.S. about 15 per cent above the average for the other
countries. The share in education expenses is cut sharply by measuring it -in
world prices and is like that of several other countries, because education was
extremely expensive in the U.S. relative to other forms of investment.- 36-
TheDistribution of the Stock of Capital Among Types of Assets
Another way to examine the allocation of investment is through the
distribution of the stock of capital. This can be done using Goldsmith's data
for reproducible tangible assets in the late 1970's. The distribution of the
stock of capital incorporates not only the cumulation of investment and depre-
ciation over time but also the effects of any differencesamong the various
types of assets with respect to price movements.
The shares of dwellings in reproducible assets, summarized below, rein-.
force the impressions from shares in capital formation.
















12 countries exci. U.S. 29.1 7.2
U.S. as %of12 countries 101 165
Source: Goldsmith (1985), Table 37
The data do not give the impression that this category absorbed anexcep-
tional share of investment in the U.S. A few western European countries, in
particular, had higher proportions of assets in that form. As might be— 37—
expected,the share of dwellings was low in Japan: the lowest among the deve-
loped countries. It must be kept in mind, especially in connection with Japan,
that land is not included in reproducible assets and in national capital for-
mation, although it does enter the capital formation of individual sectors.
Land is extremely expensive in Japan and is a large part of tangible assets:
over half as compared with no more than a quarter in any of the other
countries recorded (Goldsmith, 1985, Table 37).
Consumer durables play a larger part in U.S. reproducible tangible assets
than in those of any other country. These assets were less than half as impor-
tant in Japan, but there were some European countries where the consumer
durables shares were even lower.
We can summarize by saying that the U.S. seems to be at the upper end of
the distribution with respect to investment shares in consumer durables but
not in homes, while Japan is at the lower end in both groups. If we think of
these two assets as producing services directly for households, we find that
France and Italy had about half of their reproducible tangible assets per-
forming this role, and the U.S. and most European countries had 35-45 per cent
of such assets in that role. At the other extreme, Japan, Australia, Norway,
and Switzerland devoted only about a quarter of these assets to such services.
It is important to keep in mind that as far as consumer durables are
concerned, they are not the only non-housing assets devoted to providing con-
sumer services. The category is distinguished by ownership rather than by
function. Countries with low proportions of consumer durables in their assets
may have large proportions of similar types of capital under the category of
producer durables if they are owned by business firms rather than by house-- 38—
holds(e.g., consumer durables in rented houses as opposed to those in owner-
occupied houses).
SavinQ vs. Capital Formation
We have discussed saving and capital formation rates as if they were iden-
tical although they differ to the extent that a country is financing its capi-
tal formation by borrowing from foreigners or is financing other countriest
capital formation by lending to foreigners. We have been able to do this in
analyses of long-run developments because, for developed countries, over
periods long enough to average out cyclical changes, the two measures are
typically very similar. Kuznets (1966, p. 240), in discussing trends in the
share of capital formation and saving in output, pointed out that the dif-
ference was important for only the U.K., among lending countries, and for some
of the small borrowing countries in the early stages of development. For the
developed countries considered here, the two ratios are very similar, as has
been pointed out by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). They reported that for the
period 1960-74, the average absolute difference between gross saving and gross
capital formation ratios among 21 developed countries was a little over 1 per-
cent of GDP and a little over 5 percent of the saving ratio, 4 percent for the
countries we discuss in this chapter. For 1970-79, the difference was about 4
percent of gross capital formation for the 15 countries we cover, but it rose
to over seven percent in 1980-84 (Appendix Table 16). Thus, for most periods,
and particularly for judging changes over longer spans, it is appropriate to
use the saving rate and the capital formation rate interchangeably.
The latest period, 1980-84, shows an unusual degree of divergence between
the two, and the absolute amounts, particularly f or the U.S., are enormous.- 39-
However,even the 1984 U.S. deficit in the $100 billion range was only 2.5 per-
cent of GOP, and the deficit of 1980-84 averaged under 4 per cent of gross
capital formation. Half of the countries covered here were borrowing from
abroad larger portions of the financing of their domestic capital formation in
1980-84 than the U.S. was.

















Source: Appendix Table 16
The 1984 deficit was, of course, much larger relative to gross capital
formation -over13 per cent. It is that very recent history, and its con-
tinuation into the present and the future, that provokes alarm. In judging
long-term trends, however, it is important to keep in mind that such deficits
have not been typical of the U.S.- 40-
Summary
We have found that, by a broad definition of capital formation, the U.S.
has been investing a proportion of its gross domestic product that is not
far below that of other developed countries over the past decade and a half.
Thus, the U.S. has not been a particularly extravagant nation, although most
countries invest larger shares of their output.
The U.S. long run ratio of gross capital formation to GNP, measured by the
conventional definition, was about the same before and after World War II.
In the earlier period (1869-1938), that ratio placed the U.S. in the front
ranks of countries in this respect, but since 1950, the ratios for other
countries have risen to higher levels. While the proportion of output devoted
to capital formation may have been a little lower in the U.S. than in other
countries, the U.S. got more real capital than most countries out of a given
amount of investment because prices of capital goods were relatively low in
the U.S. Thus, in world prices, or real terms, U.S. investment was higher
relative to output than in the nominal terms in which the comparison is
usually made.
If we examine real capital formation per capita, even by a narrow defini-
tion of capital formation, the lower U.S. proportion of capital formation in
output, combined with the higher U.S. output per capita, resulted in a U.S.
investment per capita above that of developed countries as a group. For a
broad measure of capital formation, the U.S. margin relative to the average
was even larger, and few countries surpassed the U.S.
The results of many years of capital formation, as incorporated into capi-
tal stock measures, confirm the impression that the U.S. continues to be rela-- 41-
tivelyrich in capital. Even by conventional definitions of capital stock or
only slightly expanded definitions, the U.S. remained, at the beginning of the
1980's, as the country with the largest real capital stock per capita.
Although a few small countries may have moved ahead of the U.S. in this
respect, the major developed countries, and particularly Japan, remained
substantially below the U.S. level.
Within the total of capital accumulation the U.S. did not, as is often
supposed, devote an exceptionally large share to residential construction or a
particularly small share to machinery and equipment. The U.S. did devote a
relatively large part of capital formation to consumer durables but again, the
real outlier was Japan, in which the share of such investment was very low
compared to almost all the other countries. It should be noted that consumer
durables are distinguished from producer durables not by their function or by
whether they serve the production of consumer goods rather than producer
goods, but by the fact of their ownership by households. Some part of producer
durables in one country may be performing the same functions, under different
ownership, as consumer durables in another country.
Taking the broader view of capital formation, we found that Japan devoted
an exceptionally large part of total investment to the conventional forms,
particularly to construction, and the U.S. an exceptionally small fraction.
That is part of the reason why Japan's capital formation ratio appears so high
and that of the U.S. so low relative to other countries when the comparisons
are based on the conventional definitions. The U.S. spent relatively large
proportions of capital formation on consumer durables, military capital for-
mation, R&D, and, to a smaller extent, on education.- 42-
Whatdoes this record say about the widespread impression that the U.S. is a
nation of spendthrifts, unwilling to provide for the future? We conclude that
this belief rests on observation of a particular narrow definition of capital
formation, on the use of nominal values that ignore international differences in
the relative price of capital goods, and on concentration on the ratio of capi-
tal formation to total output rather than on the amount of capital formationper
capita. By some measures of capital formation we find the U.S. to be similar to
other developed countries and by others, above them in the extent to which pro-
duction is applied to future needs. We do not know which of these measures of
capital formation is best related to the prospects for future growth but we know
of no basis for assuming that the conventional definition is most appropriate.— 43-
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